T his study develops optimal transfer pricing schemes that manage software reuse in incremental software development, namely, a development regime wherein users begin utilizing parts of the system that are released to them even before the system is entirely completed. In this setting, conflicts can arise between developers and users from divergent interests concerning the release of functionalities in the project. The release of functionalities is influenced by reuse, i.e., the effort spent by the development team to write code that can be reused within the same project or in future projects. For example, the development team may choose to spend extra effort to make certain portions of the system reusable because doing so could reduce the effort needed to develop the entire system. However, the additional effort spent on reuse could delay the release of certain critical functionality, making such a strategy suboptimal for the users. Thus, optimal reuse decisions for developers and users could be different. In addition, from the firm's perspective, reuse decisions must not only balance the objectives of developers and users for the current project, but reuse effort may be spent to benefit future projects. Our study also highlights the fact that reuse may not always be beneficial for the firm. To this end, we consider different instances of the user-developer conflict and provide transfer pricing schemes that operate under information asymmetry and achieve two key properties: firm-level optimality and truth revelation.
Introduction
The development process of large software systems raises various important managerial challenges. One such challenge is the presence of incongruent goals among the various stakeholders involved in the development process (Banker and Kemerer 1992; Kemerer 1989, 1990) . Our study investigates user-developer conflicts concerning the release of functionality in a software project. We consider an in-house software development project where functionality is incrementally released to end users. In an incremental release regime, parts of the system being developed become usable and deliver value even before the system is entirely completed (Liu et al. 2007) . In this setting, conflicts between developers and end users can arise concerning the release times of the functionalities. The driver of such conflict is software reuse: although the effort on software reuse can delay the release of critical functions, it can speed up the delivery of the complete system. Software reuse is "the systematic use of existing software assets to construct new assets or products" (Mohagheghi and Conradi 2008, p. 3) . Reuse can affect both the development effort and the quality of a software system (Lim 1994) . While reusable software assets could include code, executables, designs, architectures, etc., our focus here is on code reuse. A piece of code can either be created to explicitly perform a specific function or developed with more general capabilities with a view toward future reuse. For example, in a system requiring multiple varieties of a sorting algorithm, separate code can be written to perform each sorting function (e.g., rank students by grades, or employees by salaries, etc.). Alternatively, general-purpose code can be written to take as input a set of items to sort and a sorting criterion; each specific sorting function can then be created by extending (or specializing) this general 542 Management Science 60(3), pp. 541-559, © 2014 INFORMS purpose code. A real example of successful code reuse is seen in CelsiusTech Systems, a Swedish naval defense contractor (Mohagheghi 2004 ). This firm was awarded two new contracts for systems that were to be built in parallel. The project management team first developed an initial code base that was common to the two systems. Then, the code base was not only reused and extended to create the two systems, but later, it also resulted in the successful completion of seven naval systems that were delivered on schedule and within budget. Unlike the case of CelsiusTech Systems, the Fly Through simulator project at the Boeing company provides an example of a case where code reuse was not aggressively pursued (Mattikalli 2011) . Instead, each new generation of the system was created from scratch, leading to a higher total software development cost.
A Motivating Example from
Oil Drilling Software To motivate the problem, we report on the case of a real software project that was carried out within a big oil exploration company. The project consisted of migrating a large legacy oil drilling application to a Microsoft Windows-based system. The application facilitates the documenting and analysis of data generated during a drilling operation. In this application, an element, which is associated with a specific drilling tool, documents and analyzes the measurements being conducted while the tool is in operation. A group, which consists of a set of elements, is used to generate reports for users. The entire software application consisted of about 750 groups and 80 elements. The groups were to be delivered to users in a fixed sequence that was agreed upon between the user department and the development team. Data collected on the value (to the end user) provided by each completed group showed that the value of a group was independent of the presence of other completed groups. Furthermore, end users did not associate any Gas level Well planning Report significant value or functionality to individual elements; value to the end users accrued only when a group was released, i.e., when all elements of that group were created. In Figure 1 , for illustrative purposes, we depict three groups (and some of their constituting elements) in the oil drilling application, namely, seismic processing, reservoir engineering, and monitoring. As shown in the figure, an element can be needed by more than one group; for instance, the element Fluid (used to identify the content of the fluid sample taken from the wells) is needed by both reservoir engineering and monitoring.
To explain the notion of reuse and specialization, consider the task of making the element Fluid reusable while developing it for its usage in reservoir engineering. To achieve this, some additional effort (reuse effort) is needed while creating the element for this group. This reuse effort must be spent during its creation, and not after the element has been created. Such a reuse strategy, referred to as development with reuse, is typical in practice (Poulin 1995 , Lynex and Layzell 1998 , Ramachandran 2005 . If Fluid is made reusable, it can be specialized for monitoring with some additional effort (specialization effort). For instance, such specialization effort may be required to enable Fluid to handle reservoir depletion, effectiveness of water and gas injection, and changes in fluid contacts-specific tasks that are required for monitoring, but not needed for reservoir engineering. On the other hand, if element Fluid is not made reusable, the element would need to be recreated for deployment in monitoring.
To highlight the nature of the conflict concerning release times of the groups, consider two key stakeholders: developers and end users. Typically, users do not know (or care about) reuse details. Users are interested in receiving important groups (functionalities) as early as possible, even if this sometimes means that the delivery of the complete system is delayed. On the other hand, developers are interested 543 in minimizing the value of the overall effort spent on the project. For example, although some reuse effort would need to be spent to make Fluid reusable when developing it for reservoir engineering, this choice could pay off for the development team because this element would not have to be recreated for monitoring. Instead, with a relatively small amount of specialization effort, it may be possible to extend Fluid for use in monitoring. However, the extra (reuse) effort in making Fluid reusable would delay the release of reservoir engineering. This delay would hurt users if they urgently needed the functionality provided by reservoir engineering.
Contributions
As seen from the above example, the release times of the various groups in a software project (and hence the underlying reuse decisions) may give rise to possible disagreements and conflicts between users and developers, often leading to suboptimal outcomes for the firm. The aim of this research is to develop optimal transfer pricing (TP) schemes to manage software reuse in incremental software development. These pricing schemes are developed from the perspective of the firm that is interested in balancing the objectives of developers and users, while creating reusable assets for use in future projects. A key contribution is that the proposed schemes operate under information asymmetry; that is, the firm does not need to know the valuations of the users for the various functionalities. Furthermore, users are shielded from the architectural details of the project and the technical complexities of software reuse. By mapping reuse decisions to group release times, we ensure that users can directly evaluate release times (rather than reuse decisions). Although our work shares some similarities with the research on goal misalignment in software development, the focus of previous research has not been on software reuse (Wang et al. 1997) . We propose optimal transfer pricing schemes under four settings: single user and single developer (SU-SD), multiple users and single developer (MU-SD), single user and multiple developers (SU-MD), and multiple users and multiple developers (MU-MD). These schemes are shown to possess two important properties: (1) firm-level optimality and (2) truth revelation under information asymmetry.
Transfer pricing provides a useful tool to management to coordinate the effective use of resources within a firm. TP is especially useful in a scenario where the firm has information of the cost of resources whereas divisions of the firm (that constitute the demand for these resources) have private information on the value of these resources. Transfer prices allow management to make firm-optimal decisions in the absence of full information (Westland 1992) . Transfer prices act as a coordinating mechanism for optimally allocating resources within an organization (Baiman et al. 2007 ) and a considerable body of literature exists on this subject; see, for example, Groves and Loeb (1979) , Vaysman (1998), and Baldenius et al. (2004) .
As a specific example of the resource allocation problem, transfer prices have been used for charging a fair price for the services provided to multiple divisions of a firm (Miller and Buckman 1987) . Here, the charge is calculated under full information. However, the charge can also be calculated when information asymmetry is considered (e.g., Harris et al. 1982, Banker and Datar 1992) . The mechanism in Harris et al. (1982) induces truth telling by the divisional managers of the firm. Banker and Datar (1992) extend previous work to a situation where the division managers can collude at the expense of the firm and propose a mechanism to operate optimally under such collusion.
In the information systems (IS) literature, transfer pricing is used among the departments of a firm to coordinate a balanced utilization of information technology services that are offered as a public good. Tan and Mookerjee (2005) use transfer prices (calculated under full information) to balance the spending on advertising and information technology. Recently, Kumar et al. (2010) designed a pricing mechanism for a peer-to-peer network that allows users to effectively share the computing resources of a firm. In our paper, we consider multiple users (user departments) with different preferences over the release times of the functionalities of a software development project. Here, the preferences of a particular user can exert negative externalities on another user. Even if the users have a common preference for the release times of functionalities (e.g., the case of a single user), this preference may result in negative externalities for the developer and for the firm.
Designing a mechanism, as proposed by Harris et al. (1982) , that deals with solving the direct revelation game can be complicated and expensive to implement (Baiman et al. 2007 ). To simplify the design of a transfer pricing mechanism, we can view the firm as an "economy" and use market power for resource allocation. In a few studies, researchers have developed and applied internal markets to solve resource allocation problems within a firm (Stuart 2005) . As an example, Baiman et al. (2007) designed optimal managerial incentives when an internal auction market is used to allocate resources. In our paper, in the case of multiple users, we deploy an internal auction designed by the firm to elicit the preferences of users concerning the sequence in which functionalities should be released. We show that this process provides solutions that are optimal for the firm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the notation and formulates the basic models. Section 3 examines TP schemes that, in Management Science 60(3), pp. 541-559, © 2014 INFORMS the presence of information asymmetry, operate optimally from the perspective of the firm. Section 4 provides discussions for possible practical extensions of these schemes. Section 5 concludes this paper.
Model Development
We first introduce the notation and then provide the formulations for the basic models for the user, the developer, and the firm.
Notation and Assumptions
In general, a group may contain several elements and each element may be required by several groups (see Figure 1) . A group is said to be completed if all the elements required by that group are developed. The software system under consideration consists of m groups (functionalities) G 1 G 2 G m , with each group consisting of a subset of elements. Let = M 1 M 2 M n denote the set of elements, and let = 1 2 n be the corresponding index set. Let = G 1 G 2 G m and = 1 2 m denote the set of groups and the corresponding index set, respectively. We assume that a group is released for endusers as soon as it is completed.
We refer to the membership of an element in a group as that element's usage. We assume that each element has at most one usage per group.
1 For example, if element M i is associated with i groups, then this element has exactly i distinct usages (one for each group it is associated with). Let r i be the development time of M i i = 1 2 n. Based on our discussion earlier related to the physical implementation of reuse, let i ∈ 0 1 denote the fraction of the development time needed to make M i ready for reuse. Let ik ∈ 0 1 denote the fraction of the development time needed to make M i specialized for its usage at group G k . The additional time needed to make M i ready for reuse is i r i , and is referred to as its reuse time. Subsequently, the time needed to specialize this reusable element for use in a (different) group, say, G k , is ik r i , and is referred to as its specialization time for that group. Thus, if an element M i , required by a group, say, G k , has been made ready for reuse at an earlier group in the sequence, then only the specialization time ik r i is incurred for developing M i in G k . Otherwise, (a) if M i is made ready for reuse at G k , then a development time of 1 + i r i is incurred for its development in G k ; (b) if M i is not made ready for reuse, then the development time incurred is r i for its development in G k . For an element M i , let y ik = 1 if M i is made ready for reuse in G k , and y ik = 0 otherwise. Let y i = k∈ y ik . Clearly, y i ≤ 1. Finally, letȲ = y 1 y 2 y n denote the "reuse vector" of binary reuse decisions y i i ∈ ; that is,Ȳ holds the reuse decisions for all elements.
Groups are developed in a sequence. Since the software system consists of m groups, there are = m! possible distinct group sequences for the project. Let be the set of all group sequences. Then, we have = S 1 S 2 S , where S ∈ denotes a particular sequence drawn from the set . Depending on both the sequence of the groups and the reuse decisions, the release time (the time a group is completed and released) of a group may be different. Let the release time of G k be denoted by T k k ∈ . For groups G 1 G 2 G m , let the corresponding completion times, T 1 T 2 T m , be represented by a vector,T = T 1 T 2 T m referred to as a releasetimes vector (RTV). Note that the entries of RTVT may not be in ascending order. We are now ready to describe how an RTV, which corresponds to a specific group sequence and a set of reuse decisions, can be generated.
Recall that, given a sequence S , for each M i , we have i + 1 different possible reuse decisions: (i) one corresponding to the case where M i is not made ready for reuse and (ii) i reuse decisions, with each corresponding to the case where M i is made ready for reuse at one of the i distinct usages of M i . Each combination of reuse choices for the n elements corresponds to a vector of release times of the groups. Thus, we have = n i=1 i + 1 possible RTVs for any sequence S . Since we have m! group sequences, there are a total of = m! · possible RTVs for the project. Let = 1 2 be the index set of RTVs, and letT
f ∈ , be the RTV whose component T f k k ∈ , denotes the release time of G k . We now describe how the developer generates the RTVs for a given group sequence, say, S = G 1 G 2 G m , and a set of reuse decisions (i.e., the values y ik , i ∈ , k ∈ ):
The second and third equations ensure that the groups are completed in the given sequence S . The first equation calculates the time t ik spent on M i for its usage in G k and can be explained as follows: Let A ik = 1 if M i belongs to G k and 0 otherwise. First, the entire expression on the right-hand side is nonzero only if A ik = 1. Then, we have three cases: 1. If M i is made ready for reuse before G k , then we have the expression s<k y is = 1 and y ik = 0. Number of distinct usages of M i in the project, i ∈ Therefore, t ik = A ik r i ik , i.e., only the specialization time is incurred. 2. If M i is not made ready for reuse before G k but is made reusable in G k , then s<k y is = 0 and y ik = 1. Thus, the time spent on M i in G k is A ik r i 1 + i .
3. If M i has not made ready for reuse before and will not be made ready for reuse in G k , then t ik = A ik r i , i.e., M i has to be recreated.
The main notation used in the remainder of this paper is summarized in Table 1 .
As mentioned in §1, there are two primary stakeholders involved in the software development process: the user and the developer. Regarding the reuse of each element, there are two critical questions to be answered: (i) Should the element be made ready for reuse? (ii) If yes, when would be the best time to make the element ready for reuse? The second question is relevant because, even if the answer to the first question is positive, investing reuse effort for an element at its first usage may not always be optimal for both the developer and the user. Rather, it may be better to postpone the investment of the reuse effort to one of the element's later usages. Next, we formulate the problems of the developer, the user, and the firm.
Developer's Problem
As discussed earlier, the developer's objective is to minimize the monetary value of the total time spent on the project. Let T Since the developer focuses on minimizing the monetary cost corresponding to the makespan of the project, the reuse decisions corresponding to a developer-optimal RTV naturally serve the purpose of shortening the makespan. Theorem 1. If an element is developed as reusable in a developer-optimal RTV, then the element is made ready for reuse at its first usage in the sequence corresponding to this RTV.
2
Theorem 1 highlights the natural attitude of the developer toward creating reusable elements. If it is profitable for the developer to make an element ready for reuse, then it is better to do so at its first usage. All future usages following the first usage of that element benefit from this reuse decision. Although the reuse strategy indicated in Theorem 1 is optimal for the developer, such a strategy may not be optimal for the user. Next, we describe the problem of the user (or user department).
User's Problem
We assume that once a group in this system has been completed (and released), the users can use the functionality provided by this group throughout the system's useful life. Let V k denote the monetary value per unit of time provided by group G k , k ∈ . The benefit derived from a group is the product of the duration of its availability, i.e., the duration of the time from the moment it is completed (and released) until the moment the system's useful life ends, and the value it provides per unit of time. Then, the aggregate benefit from the system that the user can derive is the sum of such products over all the groups; the objective of the user is to maximize this benefit. Assuming the lifespan of the system is sufficiently large, i.e., at least greater than the maximum possible makespan, and, given a set of RTVs, it is easy to see that the user's objective is equivalent to that of finding the optimal RTV to minimize the sum of the products of the completion time (i.e., release time) of each group and its value per unit of time.
In general, each RTV could result in a different objective function value (cost) for the user. Therefore, from a given set of RTVs, the user selects one that minimizes its cost. By selecting its optimal RTV among the set of all possible RTVs, the user also selects the optimal group sequence in which the project should be completed. For the rest of this paper, we refer to Management Science 60(3), pp. 541-559, © 2014 INFORMS the user's RTV selection problem as Problem U. This problem can be formally stated as follows:
The developer and the user have their respective costs, i.e., objective function values, for each RTVT f , f ∈ . By definition, each RTV corresponds to a group sequence and a set of reuse decisions for the elements; i.e., whether or not an element should be made reusable and, if yes, the group for which it should be made reusable. Note that, even though the user is not directly involved in making reuse or group sequencing decisions, by selecting an RTV, the user implicitly signals a preference for a set of reuse decisions as well as a group sequence.
Firm's Problem
In addition to the total cost incurred by both the user and the developer, the firm's concern (Problem F below) also includes the benefit derivable from reusable elements for future projects. If an element has a reuse value for future projects, we refer to this value as the element's external reuse value. Let B i denote the estimated external reuse value of element M i , i ∈ . Let B f be the total external value of all elements that are made ready for reuse when
n be the reuse decision vector corresponding to RTVT f . Then, we have B f = i∈ B i y f i . The external reuse values can be assumed to be estimated by a separate organizational unit that evaluates software architectures across projects to facilitate reuse. Such departments are common in large organizations (Christensen and Ron 2000) . 2.4.1. Problem F. The firm's objective is to choose an RTV that minimizes the sum of weighted completion times (the user's objective) and the total effort incurred during the project (the developer's objective) minus the external reuse values of all the elements:
In the above, the first two components of the firm's objective are, respectively, the costs incurred by the user and the developer. The third component calculates the total external reuse value of the elements. The firm does not know the user's group valuations (V k k ∈ ). However, the developer's pay rate (X) and the external reuse values (B f f ∈ ) are known to the firm.
The Conflict Between the Developer
and the User It is easy to see that the RTVs corresponding to the optimal solutions to Problems D and U can be different. To illustrate this, we provide an example below. Example 1. Consider three groups G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 , which are to be developed and released in the sequence (G 1 G 2 G 3 ). Let the values of the groups per unit of time be as follows: V 1 = 4 and V 2 = V 3 = 1. Assume that G 1 consists of element M a , G 2 consists of elements M a and M b , and G 3 consists of element M b . Let r a = r b = 1, a = b = 0 5, a1 = a2 = b2 = b3 = 0 4, B a = 0, B b = 1, and X = 5. We summarize the results in Table 2 .
As shown in Table 2 , the cost for the user, k∈K T f k V k , is minimum when RTVT 1 is selected. Thus, the user's optimal RTVT 1 corresponds to the case where no reuse occurs. However, the developer's objective function is minimum when RTVT 2 is selected. This RTV corresponds to the case where M a and M b are made ready for reuse during their usages at G 1 and G 2 , respectively.
For the situation in Example 1, the groups will be completed either according to RTVT 2 in a developerdominant scenario, orT 1 in a user-dominant scenario. However, neither of these vectors is optimal for the firm; as shown in Table 2 , if the firm had full information, then the firm-optimal solution would be RTVT 3 . The main takeaway from this example is that since the optimal RTVs for the problems of the three parties can all be different, there may be no common solution (or RTV) that they can agree on. Furthermore, reuse is not always a good thing for the overall goal of the firm. This is clear when we observe that the developer's optimal choice is to make both M a and M b reusable. However, the firm would not choose to make M a reusable because doing so would significantly hurt the user. This motivates the need for a common solution for the developer and the user. Of further interest is the issue of whether or not this common solution is optimal for the firm. Table 2 Computations in Example 1
(1, 1) 1 5 3 4 3 8 13 2 3 8X = 19 31 2 3 (0, 1) 1 3 5 3 9 11 4 3 9X = 19 5 29 9
Note. The boldfaced numbers in the fourth, fifth, and sixth columns (i.e., the numbers 11, 19, and 29.9) correspond to the respective optimal objective values for the user, the developer, and the firm.
Optimal Transfer Pricing
As discussed above, because of differences in their individual objective functions, the RTVs corresponding to the optimal solutions of the developer and the user may be different, leaving both parties without a common solution. Even worse, the individual solutions of the two sides for their respective problems may be different than the firm-optimal solution. In this section, we propose TP schemes through which both the user and the developer arrive at a firm-optimal solution. The firm is assumed to know the developer's pay-rate (X), but does not know a user's group valuations. We consider four possibilities: SU-SD, MU-SD, SU-MD, and MU-MD. For each TP scheme, we discuss the following three questions:
1. Will the TP scheme result in a firm-optimal solution?
2. Will the developer(s) be better off as a result of implementing the TP scheme?
3. Will the user(s) be better off as a result of implementing the TP scheme?
Our main result is that each TP scheme results in optimal transfer prices, even though the firm may not know the user group valuations. The term "optimal transfer prices" refers to those transfer prices that lead to decisions from the user(s) and the developer(s), such that the overall solution is optimal for the firm. The transfer prices computed under these schemes are incentive compatible to both the user and the developer, i.e., the concerned parties are weakly better off in the presence of the proposed schemes than without them. In general, the firm-optimal solution (i.e., the solution vector) is not unique and neither are the optimal transfer prices. The primary focus of our transfer pricing schemes is to find one vector of transfer prices that guarantees a firm-optimal solution and satisfies incentive compatibility for both parties. As we will see later, the answers to the second and third questions above depend on the particular TP scheme being considered.
Single User and Single Developer
In this case, we assume a single developer who develops elements one at a time. Note that the development sequence of the elements within a group does not matter, since all the elements in a group must be developed for the group to be completed.
3.1.1. Description of SU-SD. Under the SU-SD scheme, the developer reports all possible RTVs (over all reuse decisions and all group sequences) and the corresponding reuse vectors to the firm. The firm conveys to the user these RTVs together with a transfer price (p f ) for each RTV (T f f ∈ ). Next, the user selects the RTV that minimizes the time-weighted group valuations plus the price, i.e., min f ∈ T f k V k + p f , and pays the firm the price for the selected RTV. Note that the total cost the user incurs for an RTV is separable, in the sense that it is the sum of the user's time-weighted valuation for that RTV and the corresponding transfer price. Finally, the firm pays an amount that makes the developer indifferent between the selected RTV and the developeroptimal RTV. A formal description of the procedure is provided in the appendix. Sequence of Events in SU-SD. 1. The developer provides the RTVs and their corresponding reuse vectors to the firm.
2. The firm identifies the developer-optimal RTV and, based on this RTV, computes a transfer price for each RTV.
3. The firm shares with the user the RTVs along with their associated prices.
4. To select an optimal RTV, the user minimizes its cost (the user's objective function value plus the transfer price) over the RTVs.
5. The user pays the firm (if needed) and the firm pays the developer (if needed).
3.1.2. Computing the Transfer Prices. The transfer price for a given RTV reflects two kinds of externalities: (a) the difference between the total external reuse values of the elements that are not made ready for reuse for that RTV and for the developeroptimal RTV, and (b) the loss the developer incurs if that RTV does not correspond to a developer-optimal solution. For each RTV, say,T f , the firm computes the quantity T f z X − B f (referred to hereafter as the RTV-cost), where T f z X is the cost the developer incurs, and B f is the total external value of all the elements that are made ready for reuse in this RTV. The firm then identifies the developer-optimal RTV, i.e., the RTV that minimizes the developer's cost across all RTVs (min f ∈ T f z X). Next, the price for the RTVT f , i.e., p f , is computed by taking the difference between the RTV-cost for RTVT f and the RTV-cost for the developer-optimal RTV.
Below, we illustrate SU-SD with an example:
Example 2. In this example, we specialize the data in Example 1 by having identical external reuse values for the elements M a and M b , i.e., B a = B b = 1. Table 3 summarizes who knows what in this example. Table 4 lists the objective function values of the user, the developer, and the firm. Table 3 Information Possessed by Each Party
reuse value) value of unit time) valuations)
The firm The developer The user 
Notes. The boldfaced numbers in the fourth, seventh, and ninth columns (i.e., the numbers 19, 11, and 29.9) correspond to the respective optimal objective values, without the transfer pricing scheme, for the developer, the user, and the firm. The boldfaced number in the eighth column (i.e., the number 12.9) corresponds to the user's optimal cost under the transfer pricing scheme.
Since the number of usages for M a and M b are a = 2 and b = 2, respectively, the total number of possible combinations of reuse decisions for the two elements is = a + 1 b + 1 = 9. Given that there are three groups, the total number of possible group sequences is = 6. Thus, there are = 6 × 9 = 54 possible RTVs. For brevity, we present only three RTVs corresponding to the sequence S 1 = G 1 G 2 G 3 . Without considering the transfer prices, the user would select RTVT 1 and not make either of the elements reusable. The developer's optimal solution is RTVT 2 , which corresponds to making both the elements reusable. If the firm knew the group valuations, then the firm's optimal solution would be RTVT 3 , which corresponds to making only M b reusable. Under SU-SD, the firm first identifies the developer-optimal RTV, which is RTVT 2 . Then, to compute the transfer prices, the firm takes the difference between the RTV-cost for any RTV and the RTVcost for the developer-optimal RTV (see §3.1.2 for the RTV-cost formula). The transfer prices are shown in the sixth column of Table 4. Notice that in the case of SU-SD, the firm only uses X and RTVs for determining the transfer prices. Given the transfer prices, the user selects the RTVT 3 , and pays the firm 1 5. Finally, the developer receives 0 5 from the firm and is indifferent between the RTVsT 3 andT 2 . In this example, the user is better off as a result of implementing SU-SD. Without SU-SD, it is natural to expect that the developer's optimal solution would be implemented. In this case, the user incurs a cost of 13 2, which is strictly greater than the cost incurred under SU-SD (12 9). Note that the transfer price in this example (1 5) is positive; i.e., the mechanism is not budget balanced. Also, the total cost the user incurs for the firm-optimal RTV is the sum of the user's valuation of that RTV and the corresponding transfer price, i.e., the total cost the user incurs is 11 4 + 1 5 = 12 9.
3.1.3. Properties of SU-SD. We now revisit the three questions posed earlier concerning the properties of a transfer pricing scheme. The following theorems address these questions. We provide an intuitive understanding of each result in this paper; the formal proofs are provided in the appendix.
Theorem 2. The procedure SU-SD yields optimal transfer prices.
An intuitive understanding of the above theorem is as follows. The firm's objective consists of the sum of three components: a user component, a developer component, and an external reuse value component. Of these components, the firm does not know the user component because it does not know the user group valuations. However, since the user considers these valuations while selecting a preferred RTV, the transfer price associated with an RTV does not need to reflect the user component. The other two components, namely, the developer component and the external reuse value component, must be reflected in the transfer price in such a way that the firm-optimal RTV is selected by the user. Thus, under SU-SD, the transfer price includes the externalities imposed on the developer's cost and on the external reuse value. Note that, under SU-SD, the firm does not need to elicit the time-weighted group valuations of the user.
Theorem 3. The user is weakly better off under SU-SD than under a developer-optimal solution.
Under SU-SD, the transfer price for the developeroptimal solution is set to zero. Furthermore, this solution is also feasible for the user. Thus, the total cost the user incurs (the user's own objective function value plus the transfer price) for the solution under SU-SD is at most that incurred for the developeroptimal solution. Note that our version of SU-SD uses the developer-optimal RTV as a benchmark to set the transfer prices for the user. Instead, any arbitrary RTV can be used as a benchmark to set the transfer prices. In this sense, the TP scheme under SU-SD also bears a resemblance with Nash bargaining. The transfer prices under SU-SD amount to a Nash bargaining solution in which the developer is always guaranteed to obtain its optimal solution, i.e., the developer's cost is minimized.
Remark 1. The total cost (objective function value minus any payment received) incurred by the developer for the solution chosen under SU-SD is equal to that for the optimal solution to Problem D. In SU-SD, the externality imposed on the developer by the user is collected from the user as part of the transfer price. This externality is paid to the developer as a compensation for any loss incurred as compared to the developer-optimal solution. Thus, the developer is indifferent between the user's preferred RTV and the developer-optimal RTV. As shown in Theorem 1, in the absence of any compensation, if the developer benefits from making an element reusable, then the element would be made reusable in its first usage. However, it is possible for the firm or the user to prefer a different reuse decision for that element: either make the element reusable in a later usage or not make it reusable at all. Thus, on certain occasions, a developer-suboptimal solution may be implemented but the developer would be appropriately compensated for the loss.
Remark 2. Theorem 3 and Remark 1 imply voluntary participation by the user and the developer. Thus, SU-SD is sustainable.
Remark 3. Under SU-SD, the firm does not need to elicit group valuations from the user. Given the RTV prices, the user identifies its optimal RTV, which is also a firm-optimal RTV.
Next we examine the scenario where there are multiple users, with each interested in a subset of groups. We provide a TP scheme where users naturally report their true costs to the firm, and the firm picks an RTV that results in optimal transfer prices.
Multiple Users and Single Developer
Consider the situation when there is a single developer but multiple users, e.g., accounts payable, purchasing, inventory, with each benefiting from a subset of the groups. For example, the userdepartment "inventory" requires only the groups (functionalities) related to tracking inventory accurately, managing orders and purchases, determining reorder points, etc. Thus, each user values a subset of the groups. Note that the firm does not know the group valuations of the users. Although our proposed TP scheme remains valid when multiple users have positive valuations for the same group, for simplicity of exposition we will assume that the subsets of groups corresponding to the different users are mutually exclusive. For example, suppose we have four groups, G 1 , G 2 , G 3 , and G 4 , and two users. Then, a possible scenario is that the first user only requires groups G 1 and G 4 , whereas the second requires only G 2 and G 3 . Since the users are interested in different subsets of groups, they naturally may have different preferred RTVs. This, in turn, adds an additional complexity (relative to the case where we had a single user) of finding an RTV that all users, the developer, and the firm agree on. In the case of multiple users, in addition to the conflict between the developer and users, there might also be conflicts among the users themselves. This latter type of conflict is the main difference between a setting that considers multiple users and that for a single user. Under the MU-SD scheme below, the firm uses transfer prices to identify a firm-optimal RTV, i.e., firm-optimal reuse and group sequencing decisions.
3.2.1. Description of MU-SD. Under MU-SD, identify its optimal RTV, the firm designs an auction for the users based on the well-known Clarke (1971) mechanism.
4 The Clarke mechanism (also referred to as the Pivotal mechanism) is an individual-rational, efficient, and strategy-proof mechanism that can be used to determine taxpayers' true valuations of public projects. We use this mechanism in the context of our problem. 5 The key point in designing an RTV auction for the users is that the firm computes a transfer price for each RTV in such a way that each user truthfully reveals the sum of its time-weighted group valuations. Before providing a detailed description of how the firm determines the transfer prices under MU-SD, we summarize below the sequence of events in this TP scheme. A formal description of MU-SD is provided in the appendix.
Sequence of Events in MU-SD. 1. The firm announces how the transfer prices will be determined (to be discussed shortly in §3.2.2). Note that the firm only announces the pricing scheme, not the prices themselves. The prices are calculated using the Clarke mechanism, where each user is asked to pay for the externality imposed on the other users, as well as on the developer and the firm.
2. The developer provides the RTVs and their corresponding reuse vectors to the firm. The firm shares these RTVs with the users.
3. For each RTV, each user reveals its bid, which is the sum of the time-weighted group valuations (in Theorem 4, we show that it is a dominant strategy for the users to reveal their bids truthfully).
4. Based on the bids of the users, the firm picks the firm-optimal RTV. For this RTV, the firm computes and then reveals user-specific transfer prices to each user.
Users pay the firm (if needed) and the firm pays the developer (if needed).
Next, we explain how the transfer prices are determined.
Computing the Transfer Prices.
At the end of MU-SD, each user pays the firm a transfer price, Management Science 60(3), pp. 541-559, © 2014 INFORMS which equals the sum of the externalities each user imposes on the other users, the developer, and the firm. Let U be the user of interest. Given the bids of the users, the firm first identifies the firm-optimal RTV by solving Problem F (see §2.4). Let the firmoptimal RTV be denoted byT w . Next, to determine the total externality U imposes on the other parties, the firm solves Problem F without considering U 's bids, i.e., the firm determines the firm-optimal RTV in the absence of U . Let this RTV be denoted byT . If these two RTVs are the same, then U does not impose an externality on any of the parties; otherwise, it is clear that U influences the firm's decision to choose RTVT w (instead ofT ). This influence on the firm's choice leads to three externalities:
(i) The objective function value of the developer may be different for the two RTVsT w andT . We refer to this difference as the developer externality.
(ii) The sum of the external reuse values of the elements that are made ready for reuse inT w may be different from that inT . We refer to this externality as the reuse externality.
(iii) Because the release times of the groups inT w may be different from those inT , users may incur different costs for these RTVs. We refer to the total change in the sum of the costs of the other users (i.e., users other than U ) as the user externality. Note that each of the externalities above can be negative, zero, or positive. Example 3 below illustrates how the transfer price, which is the sum of the three externalities, is computed for each user.
Example 3. In this example, we consider the same data as in Example 1. Suppose groups G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 are required by users U 1 , U 2 , and U 3 , respectively. Thus, = 1 2 3 . Let ⊆ denote the set of the groups that U utilizes, and let 1 = 1 , 2 = 2 , and 3 = 3 . Let b f denote the bid U makes for RTVT f . For brevity, we only consider four RTVs corresponding to the sequence G 1 G 2 G 3 .
As shown in Table 5 ,T 1 is the optimal RTV for U 1 , T 2 for both U 3 and the developer,T 3 for both U 1 and the firm, andT 4 for U 2 . Note that the group valuations are not known to the firm. In the following, Table 5 Computations in Example 3 for Users U 1 , U 2 , U 3 , the Developer, and the Firm 1 0 1 5 2 9 3 9 6 2 9 3 9 3 9X = 19 5 32 3
Notes. The boldfaced numbers in the fourth, fifth, and sixth columns (i.e., the numbers 4, 2.9, and 3.8) correspond to the respective minimum bids of U 1 , U 2 , and U 3 (i.e., their optimum solutions to Problem U). The boldfaced number in the seventh and eighth columns (i.e., the numbers 19 and 29.9) correspond to the respective optimal objective values of the developer and the firm. The transfer prices for users U 1 , U 2 , and U 3 are 0 7, 0, and 0, respectively (not shown).
we explain how the firm-optimal RTV is obtained through the use of the transfer prices: 1. The firm announces how the transfer prices are going to be computed, as discussed in §3.2.2.
2. Following this announcement, the users bid for each RTV, b f , = 1 2 3; f = 1 2 3 4.
3. The firm computes the transfer prices by considering the externality each user imposes on other parties. We now explain how the externalities that U 1 imposes on the other parties are computed. The firm solves Problem F by considering the bids of all three users and identifies RTVT 3 as the firm-optimal solution. If U 1 were not to participate in the auction, i.e., if the firm solved Problem F with U 1 's bids being excluded, then the firm-optimal solution would be RTVT 2 . Thus, U 1 's presence in the auction influences the firm's optimal solution. As a result of the firm choosing RTVT 3 instead ofT 2 , the developer's cost increases by 19 5 − 19 = 0 5. Thus, the developer externality equals 0 5. The total external reuse value of the elements that are made ready for reuse is the same forT 2 andT 3 . Thus, there is no reuse externality imposed by U 1 . However, the sum of the bids of the other two users (U 2 and U 3 ) for RTVT 3 is 7 4, whereas this sum is 7 2 forT 2 . Thus, U 1 causes a user externality of 7 4 − 7 2 = 0 2. Thus, the transfer price for U 1 is 0 5 + 0 + 0 2 = 0 7. Similarly, the firm computes the transfer prices for the other two users. The other users (U 2 and U 3 ) do not impose any externality on any of the parties.
4. At the end of MU-SD, the firm chooses RTVT 3 as its solution, and U 1 pays its transfer price to the firm. Since the firm's choice is not developer optimal, the developer incurs a cost of 19 5 − 19 = 0 5. The firm compensates the developer for this loss. As a property of the Clarke mechanism, the bids in Step 2 above reflect the true time-weighted group valuations of the users; that is, b f = k∈ T f k V k . Note that the sum of the transfer prices in this example is positive, i.e., 0 7 + 0 + 0 > 0, implying that the mechanism is not necessarily budget balanced. Also, the total cost each user incurs for the firm-optimal RTV is the sum of that user's valuation for that RTV and the corresponding transfer price, i.e., the total cost of U 1 is 4 + 0 7 = 4 7, whereas those of U 2 and U 3 are 3 5 + 0 = 3 5 and 3 9 + 0 = 3 9, respectively.
To summarize, under MU-SD, given the pricing mechanism introduced above, users reveal their true costs for each RTV. At the end of this TP scheme, each user pays the firm a transfer price. Thus, the total cost for each user is the sum of the user's own objective function value and the transfer price. If the firm chooses a developer-suboptimal solution, the firm compensates the developer for the loss.
Properties of MU-SD.
The following three results and the subsequent remark highlight the properties of this scheme.
Theorem 4. Under MU-SD, it is a dominant strategy for users to reveal their true costs, i.e., the sum of their time-weighted group valuations.
We now provide an intuitive explanation of this result. Note that any RTV that is chosen by the firm is common to the users, the developer, and the firm. Implicitly, by reporting its valuations for the RTVs, each user influences the firm's choice. For example, consider two RTVsT a andT b . Suppose user U 1 (say) incurs a higher cost forT a thanT b , whereas this RTV is a cost-minimizing one for all the other users and is also firm-optimal. LetT b be a cost-minimizing RTV for U 1 . To induce the firm to chooseT b , suppose U 1 considers misrepresentation by reporting a substantially high (respectively, low) cost forT a (respectively, T b ). Clearly, if the firm choosesT b , the users other than U 1 will incur a higher cost relative to that forT a . The externality U 1 imposes on the other parties is the total increase in their cost due to the firm selectingT b instead ofT a . By paying this externality to the firm, U 1 would incur a higher total cost (externality plus its true cost) than that incurred under truthful revelation. Since users know that they will be charged based on how much damage their reported valuations cause to the others, they reveal their true costs; i.e., given the RTVs, users truthfully reveal the sum of their timeweighted group valuations to the firm.
Theorem 5. The procedure MU-SD yields optimal transfer prices.
Under MU-SD, the firm has enough information to solve Problem F. This follows from the fact that the bids from the users reflect their truthful valuations, which, in turn, is an implication of the pricing scheme set by the firm. Thus, the firm achieves optimal transfer prices even under information asymmetry. Observe that MU-SD is more centralized relative to SU-SD, in the sense that here the firm itself chooses an RTV at the end of the process.
Theorem 6. Any user is weakly better off under MU-SD than its worst solution without any transfer pricing intervention.
Formally, under MU-SD, the total cost a user incurs (user's objective function value plus the transfer price) is at most its maximum possible objective function value (i.e., the maximum value of the sum of its time-weighted group valuations). An intuitive explanation for the above result is as follows. Let the RTV corresponding to the maximum objective function value a user, say, user U 1 , incurs in the absence of MU-SD beT * . Let the firm-optimal RTVs at the end of MU-SD with U 1 and without U 1 beT 1 andT 2 , respectively. IfT * =T 1 , then the firm-optimal solution does not change whether or not the firm considers the bids of U 1 , i.e.,T 1 =T 2 . That is, U 1 does not exert any externality on the others, so the transfer price for U 1 is equal to 0. IfT * =T 1 andT 1 =T 2 , then, again, U 1 's presence does not influence the firm's decision. Therefore, U 1 does not pose any externality, and its transfer price is again 0. Also, since U 1 's objective function value atT 1 is less than that atT * , U 1 is better off under MU-SD. IfT * =T 1 andT 1 =T 2 , then the absolute value of the difference between U 1 's objective function values at RTVsT 1 andT 2 is larger than or equal to the difference of the sums of the objective function values of other users at these two RTVs. Otherwise, the firm would chooseT 2 as the solution even in the presence of U 1 . Thus, U 1 pays a transfer price that is less than or equal to the gain U 1 achieves from the firm choosingT 1 as the solution instead of T 2 . Therefore, U 1 is weakly better off under MU-SD as compared to the scenario where the firm implements T * as the solution without MU-SD.
Remark 4. The total cost (objective function value minus any payment) incurred by the developer for the solution chosen under MU-SD is equal to that for the optimal solution to Problem D. As in SU-SD, the firm compensates the developer for its loss if MU-SD results in a developer-suboptimal solution.
Multiple Developers
In contrast to the preceding sections, we now assume that we have multiple developers with different pay rates that are known to the firm. We assume that a single developer creates an element for its usage in a particular group. However, across the different usages of an element, the developers are allowed to be different. We further relax the assumption that the elements are developed sequentially and assume that elements can be developed in parallel within a group, but the groups are developed sequentially and are immediately released once all the elements required by each group are completed. We refer to our TP scheme for multiple developers as MD. In this scheme, we avoid Management Science 60(3), pp. 541-559, © 2014 INFORMS specifying whether we have one or many users; as will become clear shortly, to determine the transfer prices for the user side, the firm follows the same steps introduced for either SU-SD ( §3.1) if there is single user, or MU-SD ( §3.2) if there are multiple users. Let = D 1 D 2 D and = 1 2 be the set of developers and the corresponding index set, respectively. Let X denote the payment per unit effort for D , ∈ . The firm assigns usages of the elements to the developers. As before, the objective of each developer is to minimize its effort for the project. In the absence of any TP scheme, each developer solves its individual effort minimization problem and develops its assigned usages based on this solution. The groups are released as and when they are completed; that is, whenever all the usages needed for a group are completed, the corresponding group is released. As shown in Example 4 below, in this situation as well, the reuse decisions made by the developers may not be firm optimal.
Example 4. Consider three groups G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 , which are to be developed and released in the sequence (G 1 G 2 G 3 ). Assume that G 1 consists of element M a , G 2 consists of elements M a and M b , and G 3 consists of M b . Let r a = r b = 1, a = b = 0 5, and a1 = a2 = b2 = b3 = 0 4. Consider two developers D 1 and D 2 . Developer D 1 is assigned to the usages of M a and M b for G 1 and G 3 , respectively, and D 2 is assigned to the usages of M a and M b for G 2 . If the developers solve their own local problems, then neither of the two makes the two elements reusable. However, from the firm's perspective, the optimal solution is to make both elements reusable.
3.3.1. Description of MD. Under MD, the developers first generate the RTVs corresponding to different group sequencing and reuse decisions. Similar to SU-SD and MU-SD, the firm is provided these RTVs and their corresponding reuse vectors. In addition, the firm is also provided with the effort each developer incurs for each RTV. The firm next turns to the user side. If there is a single user, as discussed in §3.1, (a) the firm computes a price (p f ) for each RTV (T f f ∈ ), (b) the firm shares the RTVs and their corresponding prices with the user, and (c) the user picks an RTV that minimizes its time-weighted group valuations plus the price (min f ∈ T f k V k + p f and pays the firm the price for the selected RTV. On the other hand, if there are multiple users, then the firm auctions the RTVs following the same pricing scheme discussed for MU-SD in §3.2. After the auction, the firm obtains the transfer prices for the users. At the end of MD, if a developer-suboptimal RTV is chosen, the firm pays each developer a fractiondetermined as the ratio of the developer's effort to the sum of the efforts of all developers-of the price for that RTV. A formal description of MD is provided in the appendix.
Sequence of Events in MD.
1. The developers provide the RTVs and the corresponding reuse vectors. In addition, each developer reports the effort associated with each RTV (explained in the next subsection).
2. In the case of a single user, the firm identifies the global developer-optimal RTV (explained in the next subsection). Based on this RTV, the firm computes a transfer price for each RTV. The remainder of the scheme follows the same steps as in SU-SD.
3. In the case of multiple users, the firm auctions the RTVs among the users. The remainder of the scheme follows the same steps as in MU-SD.
4. The user(s) pays the firm (if needed) and the firm pays the developers (if needed), based on each developer's individual total effort for the project.
3.3.2. Computing the Transfer Prices. As in our previous schemes, MD needs to consider developer externality. The main difference, however, is that the developer externality is computed with respect to the global developer-optimal solution rather than the solution of any individual developer. LetĒ
f be the "effort vector," whose component E f , ∈ , denotes the effort of developer D corresponding to RTVT f , f ∈ . Thus, the objective function value of developer D corresponding to RTVT f is E f X . Given the RTVs and the effort vector, the firm determines an RTV that minimizes the sum of the costs of the developers (i.e., ∈ E f X ). We refer to this RTV as the global developer-optimal RTV. Next, depending on the number of users (single or multiple), the firm computes the transfer prices as below.
Single User. For an RTV, say,T f , the firm computes an "RTV-cost" ∈ E f X − B f , where ∈ E f X is the sum of the costs incurred by the developers, and B f is the total external reuse value of all the elements that are made ready for reuse in this RTV. Then, the firm computes the price (p f ) associated with an RTVT f by taking the difference between the RTV-cost forT f and the RTV-cost for the global developer-optimal RTV. Clearly, this price equals 0 for the global developeroptimal RTV.
Multiple Users. At the end of an RTV auction that is executed by the firm, each user pays the externality it imposes on the firm, the developers, and other users. Let the user of interest be U . Suppose the firmoptimal RTV isT w (respectively,T ) when the firm considers (respectively, does not consider) the bids of U . The computation of the reuse externality and the user externality is similar to that under MU-SD. However, when computing the developer externality, the firm takes the difference of the sum of the developers' objective function values at RTVsT w andT , i.e., ∈ E w X − ∈ E X . Finally, as a transfer price, U pays the total externality it imposes on the others, i.e., U pays the sum of the developer externality, the reuse externality, and the user externality.
The following result states a key property of MD. Because the proof is similar to that for Theorems 2 and 5, for brevity, we omit it.
Theorem 7. The TP scheme MD results in optimal transfer prices.
Given that each developer's effort for an RTV is known to the firm, the procedure to determine a firm-optimal solution under a single-user, multiple-developer scenario (respectively, a multipleuser, multiple-developer scenario) is similar to that under SU-SD (respectively, MU-SD). The additional step in a multiple-developer situation (as compared to the single-developer setting) is that the firm determines a developer's compensation individually. Note that, as with our previous TP schemes, the firm is not required to know the group valuations of the users to achieve a firm-optimal solution under MD.
Remark 5. The introduction of multiple developers has no particular bearing on the question of whether the user(s) are better off. Under MD with a single user, Theorem 3 still holds, i.e., the user is weakly better off as compared to a developer-optimal solution in the absence of MD. Similarly, under MD with multiple users, Theorem 6 still holds.
Remark 6. Under MD, a developer is not guaranteed to be better off as compared to its own optimal solution. However, it is easy to show that no developer is worse off (after receiving compensation) under MD than its worst solution (without transfer prices). Furthermore, our assumption under MD is that the effort incurred by each developer for an RTV is reported to the firm. Although we have assumed such reporting occurs naturally, the firm can execute an RTV auction for the developers-similar to the one for the users under MU-SD-to have the developers reveal their efforts truthfully.
Discussions
In this section, we confirm the validity of our TP schemes for two practical extensions: (a) when an element has multiple usages within a particular group and (b) when an element is partially reusable; that is, some part of an element is suitable for reuse while the remainder of the element is not. We end by a short discussion on complexity issues.
Multiple Usages of an Element
for the Same Group Contrary to the assumption that each element has one usage per group, we consider the case where an element may have multiple usages in a single group. Let element M j , j ∈ , have multiple usages for group G h , h ∈ . We now revisit our TP schemes to investigate whether the firm can still obtain optimal transfer prices in the presence of M j . Recall that the TP schemes introduced in this study begin with generating the RTVs. Each RTV corresponds to a possible reuse decision for each element; that is, a reuse decision on an element may change the release times of the groups. The developer can generate RTVs corresponding to alternative reuse decisions for M j ; however, if M j is to be made reusable at one of its usages for G h , then it is optimal for the developer, the user(s), and the firm to have M j made ready for reuse at its first usage for G h . Recall that the reuse decision variable y ik = 1 if M i is made ready for reuse at its usage for G k . Given a group sequence and its corresponding reuse decisions, if, for each element, the number of usages per group is known to the developer, then the RTVs can be determined. Let ik denote M i 's number of usages for G k , where i ∈ and k ∈ . The total effort corresponding to all usages of M i for G k is denoted by t ik and can be expressed as follows:
Recall that A ik = 1 if M i belongs to G k . We have three cases for the expression above: (i) If M i is made ready for reuse before G k , then we have the expression s<k y is = 1 and y ik = 0. Therefore, t ik = A ik r i ik ik , i.e., only the specialization effort for each usage is incurred.
(ii) If M i is not made ready for reuse before G k , but is made reusable in G k , then s<k y is = 0 and y ik = 1. Thus, the total effort for M i in G k is A ik r i 1
is not made ready for reuse before and will not be made ready for reuse in G k , then t ik = A ik r i ik , i.e., the developer has to recreate M i at its every usage for G k .
After computing t ik for each M i , as it was under SU-SD, the developer can determine the release times of the groups by using Equations (2) and (3).
Under a multiple-developer scenario where M j has multiple usages for G h , it is critical to know the sequence in which the elements are created. Consider again that M j is to be made ready for reuse at one of its usages for G h . Since the developers can manage parallel development in the same group, clearly one cannot claim that it is optimal to make M j in its first usage for G h . We further explain this with the following simple example. Suppose that M j in G h has three Management Science 60(3), pp. 541-559, © 2014 INFORMS usages, j 1 , j 2 , and j 3 , each developed by a different developer. Suppose j 1 and j 2 are to be developed in parallel by two of the developers, and subsequently j 3 is to be developed by the last developer. If M j is to be made ready for reuse in G h , then, neither of the first two developers benefit from this reuse decision. To generate the release time of G h , it is essential to know the sequence in which M j is developed for its usages at G h . Since both the group and element sequences as well as the reuse decisions are known to the firm, as it was under MD, the release times of the groups can be computed. This explains the generation of RTVs under both single-developer and multiple-developer scenarios. Finally, given these RTVs, the firm can simply implement the corresponding TP schemes that are shown to yield optimal transfer prices; therefore, these schemes do not need any modification.
Partially Reusable Elements
Next, we continue with our discussion on how our model treats a situation where an element is partially reusable. If an element is partially reusable, i.e., one part of the element can be developed as reusable while the rest of the element is not suitable for developing for reuse, then we consider each part as a separate element in our model. The reusable part has its own values for the reuse and specialization efforts. On the other hand, the reuse and specialization effort parameters for the nonreusable part can be set to sufficiently high numbers that make it infeasible to prepare this part for reuse.
Complexity Issues
The consideration of all possible reuse decisions for all the elements and group sequences results in the generation of a significant number of RTVs. For instance, recall from §2.1 that the total number of possible RTVs is = m! · n i=1 i + 1 , which is O m m+n . Depending on the number of groups and elements, this may add a substantial amount of computational burden in the execution of the TP schemes. To reduce computational complexity, a possible alternative in single developer situations (i.e., SU-SD and MU-SD) is to proceed with the TP schemes in phases, with each phase corresponding to an element. The justification for this idea comes from the following result:
Theorem 8. Under a single developer scenario, for Problems D, U, and F, the optimal reuse decision for each element can be obtained independently from that for any other element.
During a phase, the developer only creates RTVs considering alternative reuse decisions for a single element and the transfer prices for this element are obtained. Since the scheme proceeds element by element, the number of RTVs explored is = m! · n i=1
i + 1 , which is O m m+1 n . Thus, the time required to arrive at a solution (i.e., a firmoptimal RTV) is linear in the number of the elements. A detailed discussion of the phase version of SU-SD (denoted by SU-SD-P) is provided in the appendix.
Summary
This paper studies different transfer pricing mechanisms to manage reuse conflicts in incremental software development. There are three stakeholders involved in the reuse problem (the user, the developer, and the firm), with each party having its own reuse priorities. We argue that because software reuse is a complex and technical issue, it is not well understood by the end users of a software application. End users ultimately care about the functionality provided by the software system, so that their work can be supported. Similarly, the firm (or the management within a firm) does not appreciate the technical difficulties involved in making optimal reuse decisions. Thus, of the three parties, only developers understand reuse, but all three parties are (differently) affected by it. This leads to possible conflicts among the stakeholders, but the firm is ultimately interested in solving the reuse problem from its overall perspective. A key step in solving the above problem is to map reuse decisions to RTVs to ensure that users can directly evaluate release times (rather than reuse decisions). The problems of identifying the optimal reuse vectors and optimal RTVs are shown to be isomorphic. This transformation of the problem (from the reuse space to the RTV space) is essential to ensure that users can provide the necessary input needed to find the optimal solution. Next, we apply transfer prices to manage in the RTV space. The calculation of optimal transfer prices is complicated by the fact that the firm does not know the true valuations that users place on the functionalities provided by the different groups in the software system. Under such information asymmetry, the Clarke mechanism is used as a truth revealing mechanism. Thus, the optimal RTV and the corresponding optimal reuse decisions are obtained. We present different transfer pricing problems starting from the simplest scenario to the most complex one. In the single-user, single-developer scenario, we demonstrate that there is no need to elicit the user's group valuations (e.g., in the form of bids); that is, the optimal transfer prices can be calculated without any user involvement. Of course, to do so, the firm must know the developer's cost of effort. As we move away from the simplest case and bring in the complexity of multiple users, it becomes necessary to elicit user valuations (in the form of bids, that are shown to be truth revealing) to arrive at the optimal transfer prices. Similarly, the added complexity of introducing multiple developers requires that we 555 charge transfer prices that account for the different costs of per unit effort across developers. The different scenarios illustrate different applications of transfer pricing that could occur in optimizing reuse decisions within a firm.
